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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Lauritzen are not to be construed as exhaustive.17 The result would ap-
pear to be that future courts, since they will be allowed to consider ad-
ditional factors under the Hellenic Lines rationale, will move toward a
broadened application of the Jones Act.
JOHN A. SCANELLI
Admiralty-WRoNGFuL DEATH. Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
The surviving widow of a longshoreman killed while working aboard
the Palmetto State on navigable waters within the state of Florida
brought a wrongful death action against the shipowner, States Marine
Lines, Inc., claiming unseaworthiness of the vessel.' The district court
and the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's complaint on the grounds
that general maritime law did not support a death action, and that unsea-
worthiness was not a basis of liability under the Florida statute.2 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness is maintainable under the authority of "general
maritime law." 3 The Court reasoned that maritime law has always been
a separate body of jurisprudence, administered by different courts, with
components of civil law and common law. To insure uniform applica-
tion, maritime law should not be dependent upon either state law or
common law.
27. Id. at 1734.
1. Petitioner initially brought suit in a Florida state court (not reported) from
which the case was removed to the federal District Court for the Middle District of
Florida on diversity grounds. The district court dismissed the unseaworthiness count
(not reported) and the widow appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit certified a stipulated question whether unseaworthiness is within the
contemplation of Florida's wrongful death statute to the Florida Supreme Court. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1965) (certification procedure). Following a negative
answer to the certified question, 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968), the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1965).
3. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970). General maritime law
is a curious blend of bits and pieces gathered from various legal systems. It is a general
and rather vague set of principles that have validity in a nation only to the extent that
the nation accepts and implements them through its courts or legislation. See, e.g.,
Southern Pacific R.R. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916); The Lottawana, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
558, 572, 574 (1874). "To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of this country
is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other foreign works on
the subject, or the codes which they have framed; but we must have regard to our




Prior to 1900, the remedy of "maintenance and cure" marked the
limits of the shipowner's liability for seamen injured aboard ship.4 Un-
seaworthiness was interpreted as a certain species of the larger concept
of negligence.' The Supreme Court had foreclosed two large sectors of
seamen's rights. In The Osceola" it had denied recovery where injury
was attributed to fellow crew members, while in The Harrisburg7 it had
established that there was no action for wrongful death in the absence
of a statute. At the time no relevant federal statutes existed, and the
courts began applying state statutes to maritime cases where death oc-
curred within state territorial waters.8 In the 1920's, Congress belatedly
passed the Death on the High Seas Act9 which provided a remedy for
the death of "any person" occurring beyond the three-mile limit, and the
Jones Act1° which gave "seamen" a remedy for injury or death occur-
4. 90 S. Ct. at 1780. Under this doctrine an injured or ill seaman is entitled to wages,
food, and lodging for his period of hire, and nursing and medical treatment until
the maximum cure is realized. The employer's liability is extinguished-only if the
illness or injury results from the seaman's gross and willful misconduct. See, e.g.,
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523
(1951); Farrel v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
5. The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was recognized in America as early as
1789, Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789), and this duty
was satisfied merely by exercising due care in making the vessel fit for sea, Pacific S.S.
Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928). The breach of duty, however, did not allow
recovery of compensatory damages; it merely permitted a seaman to leave the vessel
without incurring criminal liability or forfeiture of wages.
6. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
7. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
8. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) states that the rationale for
supplementing maritime law with state wrongful death statutes is that the state remedy
would not materially prejudice the uniformity of maritime law. The general under-
standing was that the statutes of the coastal states did not apply beyond state boun-
daries. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 399 (1907), because of special circumstances, applied
state law on the high seas beyond the three-mile state territorial limit. See generally
Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 YA. L.J.
395 (1926).
9. Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any state, or the District of Columbia, or the territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedentes
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.
10. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) (commonly called the
Jones Act).
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ring in the course of employment. The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act," also passed during this period, provided
"dockworkers" with an injury or death remedy against their employers.
Ostensibly, all voids were filled. By bits and pieces of authority drawn
from state or federal statutes, seamen and dockworkers had a remedy
for personal injury or death occurring on navigable waters. However,
admiralty courts construing this piecemeal legislation were confronted
with an almost hopeless task in attempting to achieve maritime uniform-
ity. Beneficiaries prescribed under the various acts were different, 12 stat-
utory authority overlapped.13
Inconsistencies continued to appear in case law. In Lindgren v. United
States 4 a third mate was killed falling from a lifeboat while the vessel
lay at port in Norfolk, Virginia. The surviving beneficiary did not qual-
ify as one prescribed in the Jones Act, but could have recovered by au-
thority of the Virginia wrongful death statute. The Supreme Court pre-
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death
of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal repre-
sentative of such seaman may maintain an action....
A Jones Act seaman is "a man who goes to sea, a member of a ship's company
(including the master), a person employed upon a floating structure which is a vessel."
G. Gum'ORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW Or ADMIRALTY 282 (1957).
11. 33 U.S.C. S 903 (1964). "Compensation shall be payable . . . if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock) ......
12. The Death on the High Seas Act permitted a decedent's wife, husband, parent,
child or dependant relative to claim as beneficiaries. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964). It should
be noted that all the beneficiaries can sue collectively, not in the alternative as
provided in the Jones Act, which incorporates the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amnended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). Section 51 of this act
provides recovery "for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children
of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then
of the next of kin dependent upon such employee. .. ."
Examples of existing state variations are set out in Elston, Stdte Wrongful Death
Acts and Maritime Torts, 39 TPx"s L. REv. 643, 645-46 (1961). Not only do bene-
ficiaries vary, but also standards of care, statutes of limitation, defenses available,
measures of damages, and maximum amounts recoverable.
13. The Jones Act applies where a seaman is injured "in the course of employment."
This could mean on the high seas; in state waters, or on land. State law' applies within
the three-mile limit, while the Death on the High Seas Act applies beyond the three-mile
limit.
14. 281 U.S. 38 (1930). See also Whitaker v. Blidberg-Rothchild Co., 195 F. Supp.
420 (ED. Va.), aff'd, 296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961) (non-dependent daughter 'prevented
dependent mother from recovering under Jones Act).
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cluded reference to the Virginia statute, declaring the Jones Act "para-
mount and exclusive.., of all state statutes." 15
During the 1940's, courts expanded the meaning of unseaworthiness. 16
Mahnick v. Southern S.S. Co.17 began the expansion and in effect held
that unseaworthiness included negligent operations. Subsequently, un-
seaworthiness developed to include not only defects in the ship's struc-
ture, but defects in its machinery, appliances, furnishings, equipment,
tackle, cargo, and the composition of officers and crew.' s In a later case,
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,19 unseaworthiness evolved into a "species
of liability without fault" and even more strikingly extended its reach
from traditional seamen to shoreside workers. Longshoremen,20 car-
penters,2 ' ship cleaners,22 and ship repairmen were dubbed "seamen"
pro hoc vice on grounds that they performed the same duties and were
exposed to the same hazards of the ship as were traditional seamen. The
courts, in effect, had established a form of strict liability for defects found
or created about the ship. Negligence was relegated to a certain species
of unseaworthiness, and the broad concept of unseaworthiness emerged
as the principle vehicle of recovery.
As the doctrine of unseaworthiness developed, recovery for wrongful
death turned upon whether existing statutes were broad enough to absorb
this expanded definition. Of the three federal statutes, only the Jones
Act was firmly rooted to the negligence standard.24 Some state juris-
15. 281 U.S. at 38.
16. See G. GirmoRE & C. BLACK, TBE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 315 (1957). Much law
review literature has developed in connection with the Supreme Court's extension of
the unseaworthiness doctrine. See, e.g., Tereault, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the
'Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CoRNF L. Q. 381 (1954); Benbow, Seaworthiness and
Seanen, 9 MirAmi L. Q. 418 (1955).
17. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
18. Lester v. United States, 235 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956) contains a good discussion
*of what is and what is not unseaworthiness.
19. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Accord, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc, 362 U.S. 539, 548
(1960): "The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel depends not at aD upon the
negligence of the shipowner or his agents." For a vigorous criticism of expanding the
'doctrine into absolute liability see Justice Frankfurter's dissent, id. at 550.
20. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
21. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
22. Christiansen v. United States, 192 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1951).
23. Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d 599-(2d Cir.), cen'. denied, 363
'U.S. 844 (1960).
24. As originally interpreted, the Death on the High Seas Act imported -a negligence
standard. The Black Gull, 82 F.2d 758, 761 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,-298 U.S. 684 (1936).
'Subsequently it was held to include unseaworthines§ Synonette Shipyards,"Ltd; y.
Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966); Vessel Judith L Le -Rose, Inc., v. Cheirrlfisflio, 11
19701
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dictions accepted the doctrine of unseaworthiness, while others held to
a standard of negligence in order to meet the requirements of their
wrongful death statutes.2 5 In Tungus v. Skovgaard,2 the case of a main-
tenance man who had slipped on an oily deck and fallen to his death in
a hot vat of coconut oil, the Supreme Court not only looked to the New
Jersey statute to supply a wrongful death remedy for unseaworthiness,
but felt compelled to apply the statute in toto, with all its provisions and
limitations, even if it imposed a more stringent standard than general
maritime law. Maritime uniformity was thereby seriously disrupted.
Moragne eliminates many existing disparities of maritime death law.
It overrules The Harrisburg and abolishes the unjustifiable anomaly cre-
ated by Lindgren. Survivors of seamen and dockworkers alike can now
assert their wrongful death claims-based on unseaworthiness-by au-
thority of general maritime law independent of statutory reliance, state
or federal.2 9 Moragne is a momentous step toward uniformity. While
directly deciding the rights of dockworkers, it implicitly extends the
F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1963); State v. Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co., 176 F. Supp. 665 (D. Md. 1959); McLaughlin v. Blidberg Rothchild Co.,
167 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The Jones Act is predicated on negligence. When enacted it seemed to do away
with the need for unseaworthiness by incorporating FELA provisions that required
merely some proof that the employer was negligent. It permits recovery for injuries
or death "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence. . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
The Longshoremen's Act imposes liability without fault on the employer, to include
injury or death caused by acts of God.
25. See Elston, supra note 12. See also Kiius & Cecil, Marine Torts Resulting in
Death in State Territorial Waters, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 567 (1959).
26. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
27. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960) followed Tungus and applied the
greater duty of care prescribed in ORE. REv. STAT. § 654.305 (Supp. 1959): the defendant
"shall use every device, care and precaution which it is practicable to use for the
protection and safety of life and limb. . ."
28. The anomaly was that true seamen did not have an unseaworthiness claim for
wrongful death within state waters. They could not look to the state statute because
of Lindgren. Nor could they claim wrongful death by authority of general maritime
law because of The Harrisburg. They were limited to the provisions of the Jones Act
which did not encompass unseaworthiness. However, should death occur beyond the
three-mile limit, the true seaman could base his claim on unseaworthiness under the
Death on the High Seas Act. It is an anomaly that recovery should depend upon
the fortuity of where the accident occurs.
Another anomaly was that, while dockworkers, unlike true seamen, could claim for
wrongful death based on unseaworthiness under some states' law, a void existed in
those states not accepting the doctrine.
29. Moragne does not preclude the use of federal or state statutory authority.
Rather, where such laws do not provide a remedy to fit the needs of the petitioner
he can assert his claim under authority of general maritime law.
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same rights to "seamen" heretofore bereft of an unseaworthiness claim
within state waters.30 The Court advocates, without explicitly holding,
exclusive use of maritime remedies and duties of care, thereby preclud-
ing the necessity of accommodating maritime law with state remedial
statutes. 1
In spite of the sweeping authority of Moragne, maritime law must still
live with the effects of piecemeal legislation. While all voids are filled,
litigation remains unduly complicated by the need to search various au-
thorities to determine the most beneficial award.32 Congress should re-
spond by extending the coverage of the Death on the High Seas Act-
applicable to "any person"-from beyond the three-mile limit up to the
shoreline. 33
LAWRENCE J. LIPKA
Armed Services-CoNsCIENTIOUS OBjEcToRs-A TEST OF SINCERITY.
Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
In 1966, Elliot A. Welsh, II, claimed exemption from military serv-
ice as a conscientious objector.- His claim was denied. Upon refusal to
submit to induction into the armed forces, he was convicted of violating
the Universal Military Training and Service Act.2 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction.3 In Welsb v. United States,4
the Supreme Court reviewed its previous decision in United States v.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. 90 S. Ct. 1791-92 (1970).
32. The Moragne Court refrained from spelling out the elements of the new cause
of action under general maritime law. Certain technical aspects such as the statute of
limitation and the list of beneficiaries who can assert the claim can be determined
by analogy to existing federal maritime statutes.
Moragne should have expressly overruled Tungus by declaring that state statutes,
if used, should only provide a remedy and not state substantive duties. But this was
not done. Conceivably, therefore, one beneficiary claiming for wrongful death under
general maritime law, might assert his right by analogy to existing federal maritime
statutes, while another might assert his claim by analogy to state statutes using the
state statutory list of survivors and standards of care.
33. A bill has been introduced in the United States Senate which would, among
other things, extend the Death on the High Seas Act to include deaths in state territorial
waters. To date no hearings have been scheduled or other action taken on the bill.
S. 3143, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 9 (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. S 14,355
(daily ed. Nov. 14, 1969).
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1964).
2. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462 (1964).
3. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
4. 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970). 1
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